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The International Committee of the Red Cross and
Its Contribution to the Development of International
Humanitarian Law in Specialized Instruments
Knut D6rmann and Louis Maresca*
I. INTRODUCTION
As a result of its unique status as promoter and guardian of international
humanitarian law, the International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") has
been closely involved in the negotiations of humanitarian law treaties. According
to the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, one
of the ICRC's roles is to help develop international humanitarian law.1 The
article by Frangois Bugnion also published in this issue of the Journal explains in
great detail the ICRC's mandate and the legal basis for its activities in that field
as well as its contribution to core treaties of that branch of law.2 This essay will
focus on the ICRC's contribution to more recent negotiations leading to
specialized instruments in some very important fields: limitations and restrictions
on the use of certain weapons and mechanisms to repress serious violations of
international humanitarian law.
The main instruments of international humanitarian law are the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949' and their two Additional Protocols of
Dr. Knut D6rnann and Louis Maresca are legal advisers in the legal division of the ICRC. This
essay reflects the views of the authors and not necessarily those of the ICRC.
I International Committee of the Red Cross, Handbook of the Intenational Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement, Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement art 5. 2 (g) at 422
(13th ed 1994).
2 Franqois Bugnion, The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Development of International
Humanitaiian Law, 5 Chi J Intl L 191 (2004).
3 Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field (1949), 6 UST 3115 (1956) (hereinafter Geneva Convention 1); Geneva
Convention () for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea (1949), 6 UST 3217 (1956) (hereinafter Geneva Convention II);
Geneva Convention (II) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949), 6 UST 3316
(1956) (hereinafter Geneva Convention III); Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949), 6 UST 3516 (1956) (hereinafter Geneva Convention
IV).
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1977.' These treaties cover the core aspects of international humanitarian law:
protections for certain persons and property that are, or may be, affected by
international or non-international armed conflict, as well as general limitations
on the methods and means of warfare (the law on the conduct of hostilities).
International humanitarian law is, however, not limited to these instruments.
Other treaties deal with more specific issues, such as restricting the use of certain
weapons. The following sections discuss the ICRC's involvement in the
development and negotiations of the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-
personnel Mines and of the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal
Court as case studies.5 They provide a good indication of the varied and dynamic
functions played by the ICRC in the development of international humanitarian
law.
II. THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF ANTI-
PERSONNEL MINES
The adoption of the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-personnel
Mines6 in 1997 was the result of an unprecedented effort by governments,
international and non-governmental organizations, public personalities, and
private individuals to end the suffering caused by these weapons. Rarely has such
a broad coalition directed the development of international humanitarian law.
Along with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines ("ICBL'), the ICRC
played a lead role in the Convention's evolution. The ICRC's efforts in this area
encompassed its traditional role as a source of expertise on the law and on the
realities in war-affected areas, and also presented new approaches to inform and
motivate political authorities and the public at large.8
4 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1) Adopted by the Conference
on 8 June 1977, 16 ILM 1391 (1977) (hereinafter Additional Protocol I); Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) Adopted by the Conference on 8 June 1977, 16 ILM
1442 (1977) (hereinafter Additional Protocol II).
5 The authors were involved in these negotiations and the ICRC's work on these issues.
6 Its full name is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, 36 ILM 1507 (1997) (hereinafter
Ottawa Convention).
7 For an overview of the work of the various components of the international movement against
anti-personnel mines, see Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson, and Brian W. Tomlin, eds, To
Walk without Fear The Global Movement to Ban Landmines (Oxford 1998).
8 Louis Maresca and Stuart Maslen, eds, The Banning ofAnti-personnelLandmines: The Legal Contribution
of the International Committee of the Red Cross (Cambridge 2000); Jean-Philippe Lavoyer and Louis
Maresca, The Role of the ICRC in the Development of International Humanitarian Law, 4 Intl Negotiation
501 (1999).
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A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONVENTION
Anti-personnel landmines have been widely used in modern armed
conflicts, and their humanitarian impact has been severe and often long-lasting.
While they may have a military value when laid in preparation for or during
hostilities, these weapons remain active long after the fighting ends. As a result,
they have killed and injured large numbers of civilians. The presence of these
weapons has also contaminated farmland, impeded reconstruction and the
return of refugees and displaced persons, and hindered humanitarian work.
The ICRC's efforts to limit the effects of landmines began as early as
1956.9 Yet the first international rules on these weapons did not become binding
until the entry into force of the Convention on Conventional Weapons
("CCW") in 1983.10 In addition to prohibiting the use of fragments not
detectable by X-ray (Protocol I) and limiting the use of incendiary weapons
(Protocol III), the CCW also established restrictions on the use of landmines,
booby-traps, and other similar devices (Protocol II) in order to minimize their
post-conflict consequences.
Despite the rules of Protocol II, civilian casualties rose dramatically in the
late 1980s. Humanitarian organizations, including the ICRC, began treating large
numbers of landmine victims. Many of the casualties occurred during periods
when no fighting was taking place or after the hostilities had ended. In response
to growing pressure from non-governmental organizations, the CCW state
parties agreed to convene the First Review Conference to review and to
strengthen the provisions of Protocol II. Prior to the start of the Conference,
many organizations were calling for a complete prohibition on anti-personnel
mines, the main source of the problem. Yet following negotiating sessions in
1995 and 1996, and in spite of the fact that some forty governments also
supported a ban, the state parties agreed only on increased restrictions on the
use of anti-personnel mines, requirements that anti-personnel mines have self-
destruct or self-neutralization features, that rules be adopted for their clearance
after the end of active hostilities, and that other measures be taken to lessen the
danger to civilians, peacekeepers, and humanitarian operations.
9 In the Draft Rules for the Limitalion of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Populaion in Time of War,
(Geneva 2d ed 1958), first published in 1956, the ICRC voiced concern about the effects of
landmines following the end of hostilities. Article 15 of the Rules required parties to the conflict
to chart minefields and provide these charts to the opposing side or authorities following the end
of hostilities. Although presented at the XIXth International Red Cross Conference in 1957 and
sent to states for comment, no action was ever taken to develop them into a binding instrument.
10 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which
May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, 19 ILM 1523
(1980).
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Many governments and humanitarian organizations considered the new
instrument, Protocol II (as amended on 3 May 1996) disappointingly inadequate
to reduce the number of civilian landmine casualties. Not only did the Protocol
still permit the continued use of anti-personnel mines, but it included an
ambiguous definition of "anti-personnel mine," relied almost exclusively on self-
destruct and self-neutralization mechanisms, and permitted states to delay
implementation of these requirements for up to nine years. A number of states
and the ICRC, the ICBL, and other organizations continued to push for a
comprehensive ban treaty.
Dissatisfied with this result, the Government of Canada took the initiative
by inviting countries and organizations supporting a ban to Ottawa, Canada to
develop strategies aimed at eliminating these weapons." At this meeting, fifty
governments committed themselves to a plan of action to ensure that a ban
treaty was concluded at the earliest possible date and to increase resources for
mine clearance and mine-victim assistance. At the closing of this conference, the
Canadian government challenged all states to return to Ottawa in December
1997 to sign a treaty prohibiting the production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of
anti-personnel mines.
The formal follow-up to the 1996 Ottawa meeting took place in Brussels,
Belgium. Representatives of 154 countries attended the Brussels International
Conference for a Global Ban on Anti-personnel Mines-the largest gathering of
governments to date for a conference devoted specifically to the issue of
landmines. 12 On the closing day, ninety-seven governments signed the Brussels
Declaration calling for the convening of a diplomatic conference in Oslo to
negotiate a treaty banning anti-personnel mines.
Formal treaty negotiations took place from 1 to 18 September 1997 at
the Oslo Diplomatic Conference on an International Total Ban on Anti-personnel Land
Mines. Ninety-one countries took part in the negotiations as full participants and
thirty-eight countries were present as observers, as were the ICRC, the ICBL,
and the United Nations. Negotiations were successful, and on 18 September the
Ottawa Convention 3 was adopted. One hundred twenty-three states signed the
Convention at a ceremony held on 3 to 4 December 1997 in Ottawa. As of 1
February 2004, 141 states are parties to the instrument.
The Convention contains the comprehensive ban on anti-personnel mines
that was called for by many of the organizations working in countries affected by
these weapons. It prohibits the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of anti-
personnel mines (Article 1) and requires state parties to destroy their anti-
11 The conference, Towards a Global Ban on Anfi-personnel Mines, took place in Ottawa, Canada, 3-5
October 1996.
12 The conference was held 24-27 June 1997.
13 Cited in note 6.
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personnel mine stockpiles (Article 4) and to clear territory contaminated by these
weapons (Article 5). It also contains provisions to eliminate the suffering caused
by anti-personnel mines. All state parties in a position to do so must also
provide assistance for mine clearance, mine awareness, and victim assistance
(Article 6).
B. THE ROLE OF THE ICRC
Much as it participated in the development of the Geneva Conventions of
1949 and the 1977 Additional Protocols, the ICRC was closely involved in the
work to address the anti-personnel mine problem in the First CCW Review
Conference. 4 The ICRC began consulting with experts about the problem in
1993, and in April of that year it organized a major international meeting of
independent experts from armed forces, industry, medical circles, humanitarian
agencies, non-governmental organizations, and the UN to examine the problem
and the possible means to address it. The report of this meeting, the Montreux
Symposium, was sent to governments and became an important reference for
future work. 5
Preparations for the Review Conference began in 1994. State parties
requested the establishment of a group of government experts to examine ways
to address the landmine problem. The ICRC was invited to participate as an
observer and was subsequently requested to prepare a background document
outlining "[t]he rationale for amending and the ways and means of improving
Protocol II of the Convention, as well as the military and humanitarian
perspectives concerning the amendment of Protocol 1I of the Convention."' 6
14 The ICRC was also involved in the development of the CCW. It hosted a series of expert
meetings in the 1970s to look at the question of conventional weapons. The proposals and
reports from these meetings became the starting point for the discussions and negotiations of the
CCW. See Maresca and Maslen, eds, The Banning of Anti-personnel Landmines at 19-89 (cited in note
8).
15 International Committee of the Red Cross, Symposium on Ani-personnel Mines, Montreux 21-23
April 1993: Report (Geneva 1993).
16 Progress Report of the Group of Governmental Experts to Prepare the Review Conference of the States Parties to
the Convention on Prohibiions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, UN Doc CCW/CONF.I/GE/4
(1994), which can be found in UN Doc CCW/CONF.I/16 at 70 (1996). A letter sent by the state
parties to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, dated 22 December 1993, states that the
working group should consist of "Governmental experts designated by States non Parties to the
Convention." Id at 66. It added that "representatives of the International Committee of the Red
Cross could participate in the work of the group as observers." Id.
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The ICRC report was submitted to the Group of Governmental Experts in
April 1994."7 In addition to the urgent work on anti-personnel mines, the
document outlined other issues that might be considered by the Review
Conference. These included expanding the CCW's scope of application, creating
a mechanism to monitor compliance, a new protocol on blinding laser weapons,
and requirements to reduce the occurrence of unexploded submunitions. Of
these proposals, the main focus of the Group and the Review Conference was
anti-personnel mines and blinding laser weapons. 8
Throughout the expert meetings and the Review Conference itself, the
ICRC participated as an observer. In this capacity it made formal interventions,
submitted proposals on a variety of issues, and commented on the submissions
made by states and other organizations. It sought to ensure that the work and
the results of the Conference would be in accordance with and would not
weaken the existing principles and rules of international humanitarian law, would
meet the needs of mine victims and mine-affected communities, and would
prevent the use of anti-personnel mines in future conflicts.
The Ottawa process was much different than the CCW negotiations. The
states and organizations involved agreed on the need for a comprehensive
prohibition on anti-personnel mines. As a result of the work done in the CCW,
many of the issues related to a ban had already been examined and discussed.
Thus, the Ottawa process focused on identifying the elements that a
comprehensive ban treaty should contain and creating the political climate most
likely to encourage widespread support and adherence to a ban treaty.
Similar to its role in the CCW, the ICRC participated in the Ottawa process
as an observer. 9 It continued to contribute its expertise in international
humanitarian law and its experience in both treating landmine victims and
operating in mine-affected areas, and it commented extensively on the draft texts
17 Adopted as "[t]he rationale for amending and the ways and means of improving Protocol II of
the Convention as well as the military and humanitarian perspectives concerning the amendment
of Protocol II of the Convention," prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross.
UN Doc CCW/CONF.I/GE/6 (1996).
18 In addition to the amendment of Protocol II, the CCW Review Conference adopted an additional
Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV). 35 ILM 1218 (1996). This protocol prohibits
the use and transfer of laser weapons that cause permanent blindness. Just as it was involved in
the negotiation process of amended Protocol II, the ICRC was involved in the development of
this new Protocol. It organized four expert meetings to collect information and provided
documentation to the Review Conference. A compilation of the reports is published in Louise
Doswald-Beck, ed, Blinding Weapons: Reports of the Meetings of Experts Convened by the International
Committee of the Red Cross on Battlefield Laser Weapons, 1989-1991 (ICRC 1993). See also, Louise
Doswald-Beck, New Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, 36 Intl Rev Red Cross 272 (1996).
19 In addition to the diplomatic conferences held in Brussels and Oslo, meetings to develop various
elements of a draft text were also held 12 to 14 February 1997 in Vienna and 24 to 25 April 1997
in Bonn.
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of the treaty. Throughout the process, the ICRC asserted the following: the
treaty must contain an unambiguous definition of an anti-personnel mine; the
treaty must be comprehensive by banning the use, production, stockpiling, and
transfer of anti-personnel mines; and the treaty must contain provisions on the
need for victim assistance, mine clearance, and mine awareness. While the ICRC
welcomed the inclusion of mechanisms to monitor implementation, it did not
want verification issues to hinder the establishment of a clear norm against the
weapons. As reflected in the final text adopted in Oslo, the Convention
successfully addressed many of these areas.
An unusual feature of the ICRC's work on anti-personnel mines was its
advocacy campaign to help create public and political support for a
comprehensive ban treaty, conducted in close cooperation with National Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies. This was the first time that the ICRC had
engaged in public promotion for the development of international humanitarian
law. Launched in December 1995, the campaign combined elements of the
ICRC's traditional role of providing expert information to governments with
dissemination of information to the general public. Its goal was to raise
awareness about the effects of mines, the needs of mine victims, and the
desirability of a ban treaty. It also sought to stigmatize anti-personnel mines in
the public conscience so that their use would be viewed, by governments, the
military, and the general public, as abhorrent, just as the use of poison gas is now
considered an outrage.
The campaign had three elements. The first was the provision of expertise
to the discussions taking place in international, regional, and national fora. The
ICRC's medical and legal experts participated in meetings throughout the world.
The second element was the dissemination of campaign materials, both specialist
and layman's publications, on the human costs of landmines. The ICRC
published and distributed large quantities of documents on the humanitarian,
legal, medical, and rehabilitative aspects of the landmine problem. It also
commissioned a study on the military utility of landmines, examining the
benefits and problems of their use from a military perspective. 20 This study was
particularly effective in prompting discussions in military circles and promoting a
re-appraisal of these weapons.
The final, and most unusual, element of the campaign was the use of mass
media. Print and television ads were produced and placed throughout the
international media on a pro bono basis. The ads not only focused on the need
for a ban treaty but were also used to increase awareness about the plight of
mine victims and solicit support for victim assistance programs. National
societies also placed the ads in national media. In total, twelve print
advertisements and four television commercials were produced. The media
20 International Committee of the Red Cross, Ani-personnelLandmines: Friend or Foe? (1996).
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space donated was estimated to be in excess of four million Swiss francs, with a
potential audience of over seven hundred million people. ICRC delegations in
war-affected countries also assisted journalists in their efforts to examine the
landmine problem.2'
The public advocacy conducted by the ICRC and campaigns conducted by
other organizations such as the ICBL highlighted the important role that public
opinion can play in the development of international humanitarian law. Public
pressure was a vital element in creating the political will necessary for action
against anti-personnel mines among governments and armed forces. Such a
global and concerted effort has rarely been seen in the development of new rules
on the conduct of warfare.
Through its efforts in the development of the Convention on the
Prohibition of Anti-personnel Mines, the ICRC acted within its mandate to work
for the faithful application and development of humanitarian law. In many
respects its role was traditional: acting as a facilitator for the development of the
law, providing expert legal and medical advice, and sharing a perspective gleaned
from working closely with the victims of armed conflict-all expected ICRC
activities. But its public advocacy was a new element, which served to focus, in a
rapid and dynamic manner, public attention on a major humanitarian crisis. In
the view of the ICRC, this media campaign had a major influence on the
conclusion and wide ratification of the Convention.
The Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-personnel Mines is just one
weapons issue about which the ICRC has been active. As mentioned above, the
ICRC also played a role in the development of the Protocol on Blinding Laser
Weapons in 1995 (Protocol IV to the CCW). More recently, it was one of the
principal organizations behind the creation and adoption of the Protocol on
Explosive Remnants of War adopted in 2003 (Protocol V to the CCW). It has
also launched an initiative on Biotechnology, Weapons, and Humanity to reduce
the risk that developments in biotechnology can be used to the detriment of
humankind.
III. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT ("ICC")
The negotiations leading to the establishment of the ICC are another
example of considerable ICRC involvement in the development of international
humanitarian law. Why were these negotiations important to the ICRC? It
believes that it is essential for international humanitarian law-as well as for any
21 Most notable was the visit of Princess Diana to Angola in January 1997. The British Red Cross
organized and arranged the visit through the ICRC delegation in Luanda. The ICRC and other
organizations often took journalists of both the electronic and print media to medical treatment
centers and rehabilitation clinics to speak with victims and to put them in touch with other
humanitarian organizations working in the area.
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other body of law-to be properly respected and applied in practice. There are
certainly various ways of ensuring this, 2 but it is obvious that a law that is not
supported by sanctions is generally difficult to enforce. Impunity for the most
serious violations is therefore clearly unacceptable.
Existing treaties of international humanitarian law prior to the Rome
Statute establishing the ICC placed the responsibility to enact legislation and to
provide for effective penal sanctions on the individual state parties. The Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocol I specifically require states parties to
repress grave breaches of international humanitarian law, which are considered
war crimes. In accordance with the respective provisions, state parties are
obliged to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to
be committed, such breaches and to bring such persons, regardless of their
nationality, before their own courts. They may also, if they prefer, hand such
persons over for trial to another state party.23 For other breaches of the
Conventions and of Protocol I, the state parties must take the measures needed
to suppress them. In spite of these rules, however, states rarely fulfilled their
duty to provide for or exercise their jurisdiction. Regardless of the appeals made
by the ICRC and others asking states to comply with their obligations under the
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I, the situation remained static.
Until the mid-1990s, the vast majority of war crimes trials were limited to crimes
committed during the Second World War.
The creation of international tribunals was a solution to this rather
unsatisfactory situation. With the establishment of two ad hoc tribunals, one for
serious violations committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991
("ICTY"),24 and the other for serious violations committed in Rwanda or by
Rwandan citizens between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 ("ICTR"),25
the situation improved slightly. Because these ad hoc tribunals were of limited
geographical and temporal scope, the international community felt the need for
a permanent international criminal court. The idea for such a court was as old as
2 The treaties of international humanitarian law provide for mechanisms and procedures for
ensuring compliance with their provisions. Some of these mechanisms are the designation of
Protecting Powers (Geneva Convention I art 8; Geneva Convention II art 8; Geneva Convention
II1 art 8; Geneva Convention IV art 9; Additional Protocol I art 5), the institution of an enquiry
(Geneva Convention I art 52; Geneva Convention II art 53; Geneva Convention III art 132;
Geneva Convention IV art 149), the International Fact-Finding Commission (Additional Protocol
I art 90), and cooperation with the UN (Additional Protocol I art 89) and the ICRC (for example
Geneva Convention I art 9; Geneva Convention II art 9; Geneva Convention III art 9, 126;
Geneva Convention IV art 10, 143; Additional Protocol I art 81). See full citations in notes 3 and
4.
23 Geneva Convention I art 49; Geneva Convention II art 50; Geneva Convention III art 129;
Geneva Convention IV art 146; Additional Protocol I art 85. See full citations in notes 3 and 4.
24 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
25 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
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the United Nations itself.26 Efforts to create one were part of the work of the
UN International Law Commission for many years, but without success. This
inertia was largely due to the existence of the Cold War and the highly
controversial question of defining the crime of aggression. Yet with the end of
the Cold War and the many atrocities committed in Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia, the idea of a permanent court gained momentum.
The ICRC strongly supported the goal of creating a permanent
international court.27 It hoped that such a court would overcome the situation at
that time, when the repression of serious violations required a national
willingness and ability to prosecute, elements which were often illusory. In order
to garner wide support for the establishment of an international criminal court,
the ICRC brought the issue to the International Conference of the Red Cross
and Red Crescent in 1995,28 which urged states to increase international efforts
to establish permanently an international criminal court (Res. 2), and to the
Council of Delegates in 1997.29 Along with many states and organizations, the
ICRC and the National Societies of the Red Cross and Red Crescent followed
and supported the negotiations and adoption in 1998 of the Rome Statute
establishing the ICC.
A. PREPARATORY WORK AND THE DIPLOMATIC
CONFERENCE IN ROME
The ICRC was active throughout the process of negotiating the Rome
Statute. It had observer status at the various preparatory meetings and at the
diplomatic conference that negotiated and adopted the Statute. The ICRC's
main concerns were war crimes, which directly relate to international
humanitarian law.30 Thus it paid particular attention to the definitions of these
crimes. It took the view that the ICC's jurisdiction must cover all grave breaches
of the Geneva Conventions as well as of Additional Protocol I. Moreover, it
believed that other serious violations of international humanitarian law, in
particular those committed in non-international armed conflicts, must also be
included. In the ICRC's view, this was essential to giving the ICC the
26 Eric David, Principes de droit des conflits armis 673 (Brussels 2d ed 1999).
27 The ICRC's association with the concept of international criminal justice is as old as the ICRC
itself: ICRC founder Gustave Moynier first proposed an international criminal court 140 years
ago.
28 Members of the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent include the
recognized national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, the International Federation of the
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and the ICRC, as well as all state parties to the Geneva
Conventions.
29 The Council of Delegates is composed of the three components of the International Red Cross
Movement mentioned in note 28.
30 See Lavoyer and Maresca, 4 Ind Negotiation at 517-25 (cited in note 8).
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appropriate tools to end impunity for crimes committed in the majority of
contemporary armed conflicts. Taking into account the legislative developments
in many states since the early 1990s, the decisions made in the Statute for the
Rwanda Tribunal31 and the case law of the ICTY,32 the exclusion of war crimes
from the Rome Statute committed in non-international armed conflicts would
have been a major setback.
In addition to these substantive matters, and with a view to making the
ICC truly effective, the ICRC was particularly interested in making the exercise
of the ICC's jurisdiction effective and in ensuring the independence of the
prosecutor.33 With these aims in mind, it tried to convince states of its positions
through official statements in formal and informal meetings, networking, and
lobbying. Moreover, in 1997, the ICRC prepared a draft list of war crimes,
together with a commentary for the February session of the Preparatory
Committee, and submitted a paper entitled State Consent Regime vs. Universal
Jurisdiction.
34
The diplomatic conference in Rome was strongly influenced by the
extremely active and productive role played by some 230 non-governmental
organizations. 35 There is no doubt that their activities had an important influence
on the group of like-minded states supporting the establishment of an effective
court. Many of the ICRC's concerns and interests were shared by states and
NGOs and thus its views fell on fertile ground.
In retrospect, it may be difficult to assess what concrete impact the specific
work of ICRC had on the outcome. It may, however, be safe to say that the
ICRC's expertise in international humanitarian law influenced in a significant
31 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations
Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994 art
4, 1 Intl Crim Trib Rwanda YB 77, 93 (1994-96).
32 See, for example, Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No IT-94-1-AR72, 1 Judicial Rep Intl Crim Trib for the
Former Yugoslavia 352 (Kluwer Law Intl 1999) (Appeals Chamber, decision on the defense
motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction).
33 For the ICRC positions taken prior to the Rome Diplomatic Conference, see International
Committee of the Red Cross, Establishing an International Ciminal Court Towards the End of Impunity,
available online at <http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteengO.nsf/iwpList320/
3479A9BCD756A7D4C1256B66005B6966> (visited Mar 2, 2004).
34 Available online at <http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsf/iwpList320/F460C74
CA18E5F5C1256B66005C27D5> (visited Mar 2, 2004). For additional discussion, see Marie-
Claude Roberge, The New International Criminal Court: A Preliminary Assessment, 325 Intl Rev Red
Cross 671 (1998).
35 The ICRC worked actively with them but nevertheless preserved its traditional neutral and
independent stance in doing so. While the NGOs were generally more outspoken, the ICRC
relied more on its habitual quiet but firm humanitarian diplomacy. See Lavoyer and Maresca, 4
Ind Negotiation at 519 (cited in note 8).
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way the final list of war crimes adopted. Regrettably, not all serious violations of
international humanitarian law have been included in Article 8 of the Statute-
namely, some grave breaches of Additional Protocol I were not retained. But
most of the crimes in the 1997 ICRC proposal found their way into the Statute.
The inclusion of crimes committed in non-international armed conflicts was a
particular success. It clearly confirmed the acceptance of individual criminal
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed
in non-international armed conflicts, a consensus that developed in the early
1990s.
As always in international negotiations, the treaty adopted is a compromise
between opposing positions. One such compromise, which may have
implications on ensuring compliance with international humanitarian law in the
future, was the article of the Statute that allows states to avoid the prosecution
of their nationals for war crimes committed on its territory for seven years after
the Statute's entry into force for that state. The ICRC regretted this decision
because it conveys an impression that war crimes are not as serious an offence as
genocide or crimes against humanity, for which an opt-out is not possible.36
Thus far, the vast majority of states that have become a party to the Rome
Statute have refrained from invoking this option. It is hoped that states not yet
party to the Statute will follow their example and that those which have made
such a declaration will withdraw it when they realize that the ICC is properly
serving the interests of justice.37
B. THE WORK OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION IN THE
CONTEXT OF THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMES
Following the adoption of the Rome Statute, other related instruments
needed to be negotiated in order to make the future court operational. These
instruments included the rules of procedure and evidence as well as the elements
of crimes ("EOC"). The Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal
Court ("PrepCom") was mandated to draft these instruments by 30 June 2000.
In September 2002 the Assembly of States Parties adopted the documents,
which the PrepCom had approved by consensus, without further substantive
debate. Articles 6 (crime of genocide), 7 (crimes against humanity), and 8 (war
36 See Yves Sandoz, Statement on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, United
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, Final Plenary Meeting, Rome, 18 July 1998, available online at
<http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteengO.nsf/iwpList320/2AF2C3E7FE528BE2Cl256B66005B
CA8F> (visited Mar 28, 2004) (speaking as head of the delegation of the International Committee
of the Red Cross).
37 Among the ninety-two state parties to the Rome Statute, only Colombia and France have made a
declaration under article 124, see <http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/
englishinternetbible/partl/chapterXVIII/treatyl 0.asp> (visited Mar 28, 2004).
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crimes) of the Rome Statute set out lists of crimes over which the Court will
have jurisdiction, including some fifty war crimes.38 With a view toward
providing greater certainty and clarity concerning the content of each crime,
Article 9 was added. It states that the "Elements of Crimes shall assist the Court
in the interpretation and application of Arts. 6, 7, and 8. They shall be adopted
by ... the members of the Assembly of States Parties., 39 On the basis of that
rule, the EOC will guide the future judges and will therefore be of crucial
importance for the work of the ICC in the interpretation of the provisions on
crimes.
The ICRC had observer status and was active throughout the negotiating
process of the PrepCom. The negotiations on the elements of war crimes were
of particular interest, given the ICRC's mandate. Its main objective was to
ensure that the elements properly reflected existing international humanitarian
law. To that end, the ICRC lobbied extensively. It was consistently called upon
by state delegations to give expert advice in formal and informal consultations.
Thus it was able to share its views directly with negotiating states.
In order to assist the PrepCom's drafting of the elements of war crimes,
the ICRC researched and prepared a study of existing case law and of the
instruments of international humanitarian and human rights law. The aim of the
study, which was submitted in seven parts, was to provide government
delegations with the necessary legal background. The study proved to be a
crucial working tool throughout the negotiations and was repeatedly cited as the
reference text guiding the discussion. The study was officially submitted to the
PrepCom at the request of seven states (Belgium, Costa Rica, Finland, Hungary,
Republic of Korea, South Africa, and Switzerland).4"
38 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 37 ILM 99 (1998) (hereinafter Rome Statute).
39 Rome Statute art 9.
40 Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Request from the Governments of
Betgium, Costa Rica, Finland, Hungagy, South Africa and Switzerland Regarding the Text Prepared by the
International Committee of the Red Cross on Article 8, Paragraph 2 (a), of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, UN Doc PCNICC/1999/WGEC/INF.1 (1999); Preparatory Commission for the
International Criminal Court, Request from the Governments of Belgium, Costa Rica, Finland, Hungary, the
Republic of Korea and South Africa and the Permanent Observer Mission of Switzerland Regarding the Text
Prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross on Article 8, Paragraph 2 (b), (c) and (e) of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc PCNICC/1999/WGEC/INF.2 (1999);
Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Request from the Governments of
Belgium, Costa Rica, Finland, Hungagy, the Republic of Korea, South Africa and the Permanent Observer
Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations Regarding the Text Prepared by the International Committee of the
Red Cross on Article 8, Paragraph 2 (b), (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (ix), (xi) and (xii), ofthe Statute, UN
Doc PCNICC/1999/WGEC/INF.2/Add.1 (1999); Preparatory Commission for the
International Criminal Court, Request from the Governments of Belgium, Costa Rica, Finland, Hungary, the
Republic of Korea and South Africa and the Permanent Observer Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations
Regarding the Text Prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross on Article 8, Paragraph 2 (b), (c)
and (e) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc
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Costa Rica, Hungary, and Switzerland used the results of the study to
present their own text proposals for EOC during the PrepCom negotiations.41
As pointed out by the Chairman of the PrepCom and current president of the
ICC, Judge Philippe Kirsch, "[t]he ICRC not only contributed the jurisprudential
study, but carried on to play a pivotal role in the Elements negotiations.... The
imprimatur of the ICRC can be seen throughout the Elements of Crimes."42
The ICRC was encouraged to publish its study of existing case law and as a
result prepared a commentary on the Elements of War Crimes43 that is
essentially an update of the study submitted to the PrepCom.4 The purpose of
that commentary is to provide judges, prosecutors, and lawyers at the national
and international level with the background information needed to implement
international humanitarian law properly in the future prosecution of war crimes
listed in the Rome Statute. It should be kept in mind that neither the definition
of the crimes in the Rome Statute nor the document on EOC as adopted by the
PrepCom provides the complete picture necessary for an accurate interpretation
of the crimes. For example, both the Statute and the EOC use certain legal
terms (such as "attack," "military objective," or "civilian population") without
defining them. However, the treaties of international humanitarian law, from
which the crimes derive, do contain specific definitions. Judges, prosecutors, and
defense lawyers will therefore have to look to these treaties of international
humanitarian law for clarifications. The commentary indicates where to find
these definitions, in case law and other sources, and so may aid practitioners.
Given that the PrepCom left certain controversial issues unresolved and that the
EOC therefore amounts to more or less a reproduction of the Statute's wording,
it will be necessary to consult these other sources. The commentary also
PCNICC/1999/WGEC/INF.2/Add.2 (1999); and Preparatory Commission for the International
Criminal Court, Request from the Governments of Belgium, Costa Rica, Finland, Hungary, the Republic of
Korea, South Afica and the Permanent Observer Mission of Switzerland Regarding the Text Prepared by the
International Committee of the Red Cross on Article 8, Paragraph 2 (e) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (ix) and (x), of the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc PCNICC/1999/WGEC/INF.2/Add.3
(1999). The study was based on an extensive analysis of international and national war crimes
trials. It reviewed existing case law from the Leipzig trials and from post-Second World War trials
(including the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials), as well as national case law and decisions from the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda. Available national case law on war crimes was also studied.
41 Another comprehensive text proposal was made by the USA. Both text proposals guided the
negotiations.
42 Knut Dormann, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court:
Sources and Commentary xiv (Cambridge 2003) (with contributions by Louise Doswald-Beck and
Robert Kolb).
43 Id.
44 Since completion of the initial study for the PrepCom, substantial jurisprudence has emerged
from the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
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contains a short description of the negotiating history or travauxprdparatoires for
further guidance.
C. ICRC ADVISORY SERVICE, PROMOTION, ASSISTANCE IN
NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION, ETC.
International humanitarian law treaties need to be universalized and
properly implemented at the national level if they are to be effective. Through its
Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law, the ICRC promotes the
ratification of treaties of international humanitarian law and encourages states to
prepare and enact national legislation and other necessary measures to apply
these treaties at the national level. Its activities consist of producing ratification
kits, organizing regional meetings to inform participants about the implications
of a particular treaty, sharing information on how best a treaty can be
implemented, producing practical guidelines and model legislation, and
exchanging information among states. ICRC legal experts provide states with
technical assistance, for example, on legislation to prosecute war criminals as
required by the various international humanitarian law instruments,45 to
implement the requirements of the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-
personnel Mfines, and to protect the Red Cross and Red Crescent emblems. 46 A
databank on national measures of implementation has been set up and is
accessible on the ICRC website.47
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The strength and the specific role of the ICRC lie in its mandate, which is
composed of two important aspects: protecting and assisting victims of armed
conflicts on the one hand, and serving as a promoter and guardian of
international humanitarian law on the other. Through its operations in conflict
situations, the ICRC identifies the concrete problems that victims face in their
daily lives, which allows it to assess their protection needs and draw conclusions
for a possible need to develop the law.
45 See Geneva Convention I art 49; Geneva Convention II art 50; Geneva Convention III art 129;
Geneva Convention IV art 146; Additional Protocol I art 85. See full citations in notes 3 and 4.
See Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps, and Other
Devices as Amended on 3 May 1996 (Protocol 11) art 14, 35 ILM 1209 (1996); Ottawa
Convention art 9, 36 ILM 1507 (1997); Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict art 28, 249 UN Treaty Ser 215 (1954), and its Second
Protocol art 15-17, 38 ILM 769 (1999).
46 Geneva Convention I art 54; Geneva Convention II art 45; Additional Protocol I art 18. See full
citations in notes 3 and 4.
47 See <http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat> (visited Mar 28, 2004).
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If it comes to the conclusion that such a need exists, the ICRC will collect
relevant documentation, identify relevant legal issues, and, usually with the aid of
experts from governments, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, and
other institutions, prepare texts to be submitted to a diplomatic conference.
During such conferences the ICRC usually participates as an observer and shares
its expertise with negotiating states. In addition, the ICRC has often served as a
facilitator, raising awareness about international humanitarian law with
governments, the military, and the general public.
All these various functions were important elements of the ICRC's
involvement in a variety of weapons restrictions negotiations and in relation to
the establishment of the ICC. As shown in its public advocacy work on anti-
personnel mines, the ICRC can also employ a dynamic and proactive approach
to creating public and political support for international humanitarian law
developments.
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